Game Theory and Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). In 1. 95. 4 the British philosopher Richard Braithwaite gave his. Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral. Philosopher (Braithwaite 1. In his lecture Braithwaite argued. This problem had been analyzed. John Nash, the later Nobel Prize winner, using. Nash 1. 95. 0). Braithwaite predicted that game theory would. His prediction came less than. John von Neumann and Oskar. Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour—a. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1. Game- theoretic ideas can be found, for instance, in the. Thomas Hobbes and David Hume (see Gauthier 1. Kavka 1. 98. 6. Hampton 1. Vanderschraaf 1. 99. Nevertheless, Braithwaite's. Rational choice theory. Contemporary theory bases rational choice on a set of choice axioms that need to be satisfied. Rational choice theory; Game theory. 4 Game Theory, Logic and Rational Choice You (1;0) Me (0;100) (99;99) Left Right Left Right Game Theorist: OK. The standard procedure in game theory for this scenario. Game theory has not (yet) fundamentally. Ten years after Braithwaite, Brian Barry. Political Argument, and a few years later David. Lewis' seminal work Convention came out (Barry 1. Lewis. 1. 96. 9). In the late 6. 0's, the first of a series of publications by. David Gauthier appeared. In these he used game theory to develop his. Gauthier 1. 96. 7). However, until recently, the influence. Notwithstanding this faltering start, the. RATIONAL CHOICE AND SOCIOLOGY. Key concepts of rational choice theory. The stochastic, game theory model. Theory of practice, rational choice. Consider the standoff between Rational Choice and the Theory of Practice. RATIONAL CHOICE AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AS EXPLANATIONS FOR. Rational choice theory of marriage market predicts that. Rational Choice and Evolutionary. Moral Implications of Rational Choice Theories. Rational choice theories are empirical. Kantian rational choice theory therefore differs from empirical. A good example is Edna Ullmann- Margalit's The Emergence. Norms, in which she argues that moral norms enable agents to. Ullmann- Margalit 1. Her now classic. example is that of two artillerymen who face the choice to flee from. Their gun is located. If both stay, they have a. If both flee, the enemy will be able to. If just one of them. The reason for this is that they are. Figure 1). Each gunner has the choice between fleeing and. This choice is represented in the rows for. Each cell in the matrix. Each cell has. a pair of numbers. The number in the lower left corner of each cell. The number in the upper right corner represents the ranking. Figure 1. Consider the case for #1. Suppose #2 decides to stay and fight. In. that case, #1 is best off by fleeing. He will survive without getting. In the formal representation of the matrix, he will secure a. Suppose #2 decides to flee. Again. #1 does best by fleeing. He will survive the battle, although he will. If he were to stay and. Gunner #2 is in the same position as #1. In. short, each individual gunner would be better off fleeing, regardless. However, it remains true—and to some. The outcome of individually rational action is. Pareto- inefficient (or sub- optimal). For example, they could chain each other. Ullmann- Margalit argued that the. Morality binds individuals to their guns, as it. On this view, the function of morality is to prevent the failures. Mackie 1. 97. 7). First, there are some well- known problems with functionalist. The fact that a practice or an. It might be argued, for instance, that. However. until it can be shown that these apparent functions are causally. Similarly, even if moral norms and practices serve to bring. Pareto- superior outcomes not realizable through uncoordinated. Many thinkers have argued that we often are morally required. An obvious example is. It. might very well be advantageous to both slave and master (the slave. Morality is supposed to. Pareto- inefficiency which would be the. On. the functionalist account the moral agent seems ipso facto to. Functionalism. precludes an answer to this question. Functionalism appears to seek. Moral theorists are not interested principally in such. Rather, they usually seek to understand morality with the. Morality here is normative. Suppose that there were a plausible functional. Does that explanation show that. I am, in fact, obligated to follow these norms when they apply. There seems to be a difference between (a) determining the. It is. not clear how this question is answered by functionalist accounts. Morality is introduced as. In response to this. Roughly, we can distinguish two. First, there are those who model morality as the result of. Secondly, there are those who approach morality as the. We will. discuss this second approach in section 7. Here we discuss the approach. This is an. old idea in moral and political philosophy: it is the idea of the. John Harsanyi, Richard. Braithwaite, John Rawls, Brian Barry, and David Gauthier have used the. Harsanyi. 1. 95. 5; Braithwaite 1. Barry 1. 96. 5; Rawls 1. Gauthier 1. 98. 6). Gauthier, as well as many others, thinks of. That is, the predicament of the parties in. Without any. cooperation the gunners are doomed to flee and spend the remainder of. Suppose that it is possible to make binding. Does this solve the problem of. Pareto- inefficiency? It does not because it is not obvious. It might. seem that in this case there is only one way in which these can be. The artillerists could decide to. A mixed strategy is a lottery over. For example, the gunners. Whereas before the numbers in the matrix (0, 1, 2 and. For example, the utility of. This means that the. Therefore, the distribution that they will. Suppose that the gunners have a pair of. Now they can realize cooperative distributions other than 2 each. The expected. utility of this deal for #1 is 5/1. In this way the gunners can realize a whole range of. These outcomes form the bargaining area (see Figure 2). Figure 2. Intuitively it may seem straightforward that the outcome of the. Formally this is anything. Every outcome that gives each gunner an expected. Which one will. rational gunners select? Within bargaining theory, the part of game. Binmore 1. 99. 8, chapter 1). First, there is. the traditional axiomatic approach as developed in the context. This branch of game theory assumes that. The task of the theorist is to consider the bargaining area and. Things such as. the names of the parties concerned should not matter for the result. This approach has been very. Harsanyi, Rawls. Barry, and Gauthier all have used axiomatic approaches to justify their. Their verdict in the case of the gunners is the same. There are two. ways in which they could secure an expected outcome of (2, 2). They. could both stay and fight or they could flip a fair coin to decide who. The axiomatic approach pays no attention to the structure of the. All it requires as input is information about. Whereas it is true that sometimes it does. For example, if it is the case that #1. Given the rules of the negotiation process #2 will have to. On the other. hand, if the rules allow for exchanges of claims and offers the. Therefore, if you want to predict what. In addition, it is important to know whether the. For if this is not the case, it is. This is the second approach, which regards bargaining. The solution to such a. On. this approach, one needs to pay a lot of attention to detail. In fact. this is what you would expect if the proposed axiomatic solution is at. This intuition is the driving force of the so- called. Nash program (Nash 1. This program aims at evaluating. The success of the Nash program is. Such theories regard morality as the result of. His theory, however, is different from other. One of the. difficulties we signaled with regards to the functionalist approach is. Why be moral?”. It is here that Gauthier's contractarian theory distinguishes itself. Rawls, Harsanyi, and others. Gauthier not only uses. Rawls and Harsanyi sought to do, the. For this reason we discuss it in more. The first is an account of practical reason and the natural. Gauthier 1. 98. 6, chapters. Next is an account of the principles of conduct that rational. Gauthier 1. 98. 6, chapter 5). The third element is a. Gauthier 1. 98. 6, chapter 6). Lastly. Gauthier argues that the principles in question are principles of. Gauthier 1. 98. 6, chapters 7–8). The third part is. Gauthier's answer to the question “Why be moral?”. It. touches upon some very fundamental issues in game- and decision theory. This is, at least on the face of. Gauthier's response to this. The aim of rationality—to do as well as. In terms of the utility- maximizing conception of. Gauthier. forthcoming), Gauthier argues that the aim of maximizing utility does. Just as. it is sometimes the case that we do best or at least well by not aiming. In later work Gauthier develops his revisionist account. If we grant that agents may do better in any. In the book Gauthier. A number of. theorists have followed Thomas Schelling in arguing that it is often. Gauthier. thinks that if a course of action is better than any other in its. He seeks therefore to establish that. Principled action constrains one's action, and it is rational. Thus, if Gauthier is right, it can be rational to. Much. of Gauthier's work since Morals by Agreement develops and. For an alternative revisionist. Mc. Clennen 1. 99. The mode of deliberation itself about actions falls out of the. Most game theorists, however, argue instead. Gauthier's proposal into standard theory (for example. Binmore 1. 99. 4, p. However. unlike the functionalist project, the contractarian approach has a. Moral norms (or. institutions, or whatever is the object of the theory in question) are. We can make this claim more vivid. Rational parties would not agree to a norm that would leave some. Similarly with moral norms: rational. Therefore, according to the contractarian's. Pareto- efficient outcomes. For this reason, rational. The claim is not that common sense or ordinary morality. Pareto- efficient results (if followed). Instead, the claim of. Pareto- efficient. Some have argued that hypothetical contracts (or promises) do not. However, this is to misunderstand the nature of these theories. The. plurality of bargaining solution concepts that are discussed in. There are reasons to. Both the. axiomatic approach and the non- cooperative game approach proceed from. While that may be plausible in some situations, it is far. That is, the outcome of. Sugden 1. 99. 1). Contractarians like. Gauthier understand the fundamental norms that govern us as issuing. However, it is an open question whether that is an. This third way is. First. morality is seen as the unintended side- effect of the interactions of. Secondly, morality emerges from a series of repeated. To put this in functionalist terms. Third, rather than assuming full information and full. This can lead. to fundamentally different results. Rousseau describes the state of.
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